Verstoß gegen Refoulement-Verbot und Verbot der Kollektivzurückweisung durch polnische Behörden:
1. Die Verpflichtungen der Konventionsstaaten hinsichtlich des Refoulement-Verbots und des Verbots unmenschlicher oder erniedrigender Behandlung gemäß Art. 3 EMRK unterscheiden sich in Abhängigkeit davon, ob eine Person in ihren Herkunftsstaat oder einen Drittstaat zurückgeschoben werden soll. Soll eine Person in einen Drittstaat zurückgeschoben werden, ist sicherzustellen, dass durch die Zurückschiebung weder direkt (in dem Drittstaat) noch indirekt (in einem anderen Staat oder dem Herkunftsstaat) die Gefahr einer unmenschlichen oder erniedrigenden Behandlung besteht. Wird eine Person in einen Drittstaat zurückgeschoben, ist - unabhängig davon, ob dieser ein Mitgliedstaat der EU oder ein Konventionsstaat ist - genau zu untersuchen, ob eine beachtliche Wahrscheinlichkeit besteht, dass der schutzsuchenden Person in dem Drittstaat der Zugang zu einem adäquaten Asylverfahren verwehrt wird. In diesem Fall folgt aus Art. 3 EMRK die Pflicht, die Person nicht in den Drittstaat zurückzuschieben.
2. Ein Verstoß gegen Art. 3 EMRK wurde deshalb in der Vergangenheit angenommen, wenn eine "Ketten-Zurückschiebung" in das Herkunftsland drohte. Im fraglichen Fall ging es um eine drohende Kettenzurückweisung aus Polen über Belarus zurück in die Russische Föderation (Tschetschenische Republik).
3. Indem die polnischen Behörden aufgrund der Schutzgesuche an der Ukrainisch-Polnischen Grenze kein Verfahren eingeleitet haben, um die Anträge auf internationalen Schutz zu prüfen, sondern die Schutzsuchenden in die Ukraine zurückgeschickt haben, ohne zu untersuchen, ob dieser Staat sicher ist und, ob die Schutzsuchenden dort Zugang zu einem effektiven und angemessenen Asylsystem haben oder ob ihnen eine Ketten-Rückschiebung oder eine andere unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Behandlung droht, haben sie gegen den prozessualen Gehalt von Art. 3 EMRK verstoßen.
4. Die Entscheidung, den Schutzsuchenden den Zugang zum polnischen Staatsgebiet zu verweigern, ohne ihre individuelle Situation zu berücksichtigen, obwohl die Schutzsuchenden auf legalem Weg versucht hatten, die Grenze an einem offiziellen Grenzübergang zu überqueren und sich den hierfür festgelegten gesetzlichen Kontrollen zu unterziehen, stellt eine Verletzung des Verbots der Kollektivausweisung gemäß Art. 4 EMRK-Protokoll Nr. 4 dar.
5. Den Betroffenen stand auch kein effektives Rechtsmittel gemäß Art. 13 EMRK zur Verfügung, da die möglichen Rechtsmittel keine automatische aufschiebende Wirkung hatten.
(Leitsätze der Redaktion; unter Bezug auf: EGMR: Urteil vom 23.07.2020 – 40503/17; 42902/17: 43643/17: M.K. u.a. gegen Polen – asyl.net: M28846; EGMR, Urteil vom 13.02.2020 - 8675/15; 8697/15 - N.D. und N.T. gegen Spanien - asyl.net: M28138)
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42. The general principles concerning non-refoulement and the return of asylum seekers in the context of the prohibition of degrading or inhuman treatment, as well as the principles concerning procedural guarantees and the obligations of the expelling State, have been summarised in M.K. and Others v. Poland (nos. 40503/17 and 2 others, §§ 166-73, 23 July 2020).
43. In particular, the Court has noted that the exact content of the expelling State's duties under the Convention may differ depending on whether it removes applicants to their country of origin or to a third country [...]. In cases where the authorities choose to remove asylum-seekers to a third country, the Court has stated that this leaves the responsibility of the Contracting State intact with regard to its duty not to deport them if substantial grounds have been shown for believing that such action would expose them, directly (that is to say, in that third country) or indirectly (for example, in the country of origin or another country), to treatment contrary to, in particular, Article 3 (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, [GC], no. 30696/09, §§ 342-43 and 362-68, ECHR 2011).
44. Consequently, the Court has indicated that where a Contracting State seeks to remove an asylum-seeker to a third country without examining the asylum request on the merits, the main issue for the expelling authorities is whether or not the individual will have access to an adequate asylum procedure in the receiving third country. [...]
45. The Court has further clarified that in all cases of removal of an asylum-seeker from a Contracting State to a third intermediary country without examination of the asylum request on the merits, regardless of whether or not the receiving third country is an EU member State or a State Party to the Convention, it is the duty of the removing State to examine thoroughly the question of whether or not there is a real risk of the asylum-seeker being denied access, in the receiving third country, to an adequate asylum procedure protecting him or her against refoulement. If it is established that the existing guarantees in this regard are insufficient, Article 3 implies a duty that the asylum-seeker should not be removed to the third country concerned [...].
46. In M.K. and Others v. Poland (cited above), the Court examined a situation concerning applicants who had tried to cross the border between Poland and Belarus at Terespol in 2017, and in particular whether those applicants could be considered asylum-seekers and whether they had substantiated their claims that Belarus was not a safe country for them and that they were at risk of "chain refoulement" to Chechnya, which would violate their rights under Article 3 of the Convention. In that instance, the Court found that the Polish State was under an obligation to ensure the applicants' safety, specifically by allowing them to remain within Polish jurisdiction and by providing safeguards against their having to return to their country of origin until such time as their claims had been properly considered by an appropriate domestic authority. [...]
47. In M.K. and Others v. Poland the applicants were sent to Belarus, whereas in the present case they were sent to Ukraine, a Contracting Party to the Convention.
48. However, this difference did not exempt the Polish authorities from conducting a thorough examination of the applicants' situation. They had presented themselves at the border checkpoint and claimed that they might be in danger if sent back to their country of origin. Despite this they did not have the benefit of effective guarantees that would have protected them from exposure to a risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court considers that in order to fulfil their procedural obligations under Article 3 of the Convention the Polish authorities should either have allowed the applicants to remain in Polish territory pending the examination of their asylum application or, before sending them back to Ukraine, they should have examined whether that State was safe for the applicants and whether they would have access to an adequate asylum procedure there (see Ilias and Ahmed, cited above, § 137). [...]
50. In view of the above, the fact that no procedure within which the applicants' applications for international protection could be considered had been initiated when the applicants were at the Polish border crossing and that they were sent back to Ukraine without an examination of whether the receiving State was safe for them and whether they would have access to an effective and adequate asylum procedure there, or whether they would be exposed to a risk of chain refoulement and treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention, constituted a violation of the procedural limb of that Article. [...]
57. The relevant general principles concerning the collective expulsion of aliens were summarised in M.K. and Others v. Poland (cited above, §§ 197-203).
58. The Court has already found in similar circumstances that a decision issued at border checkpoints to refuse applicants entry into Poland constituted an "expulsion" within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention (ibid., §§ 204-05). It sees no reason to hold otherwise in the present case. It remains to be established whether the applicants' expulsion was "collective" in nature.
59. The Court notes the Government's argument that each time the applicants tried to enter Poland, they were interviewed by Border Guard officers and received individual decisions refusing them entry into Poland. However, the Court has already stated that it considers that during this procedure the applicants' statements that they wished to apply for international protection were disregarded (see paragraph 48 above) and that even though individual decisions were issued in respect of each applicant, they did not properly reflect the reasons given by the applicants to justify their fear of persecution. Similar findings had been made by the domestic courts (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above).
60. The Court further stresses that the applicants in the present case were trying to make use of the procedure for accepting applications for international protection that should have been available to them under domestic law. They attempted to cross a border in a legal manner, using an official checkpoint and subjecting themselves to border checks as required by the relevant law. The fact that the State refused to entertain their arguments concerning the justification for their applications for international protection cannot therefore be attributed to the applicants' own conduct (compare N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, § 231, 13 February 2020). Moreover, the request of the lawyer representing the second and fourth applicants, who was present at the border checkpoint on 1 February, to be present at the applicants' interviews and to have access to their case files was refused (see paragraph 9 above).
61. The Court concludes that the decisions refusing the applicants entry into Poland were not taken with proper regard to the individual situation of each of them and were part of a wider policy of not receiving applications for international protection from persons presenting themselves at the Polish-Ukrainian border and of returning those persons to Ukraine, in violation of domestic and international law. Those decisions constituted a collective expulsion of aliens within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.
62. Accordingly, the Court considers that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. [...]
67. The Court has already concluded that the return of the applicants to Ukraine amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb and of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (see paragraphs 51 and 62 above). The complaints lodged by the applicants in relation to those issues are therefore "arguable" for the purposes of Article 13 (see, among other authorities, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, § 201, ECHR 2012).
68. In addition, the Court has already held that an appeal against a refusal of entry and a further appeal to the administrative courts were not effective remedies within the meaning of the Convention because they did not have automatic suspensive effect (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, cited above, § 148, and A.B. and Others v. Poland, no. 42907/17, § 23, 30 June 2022). The Government did not indicate any other remedies which might satisfy the criteria under Article 13 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. [...]
For these reasons, the court, unanimously, [...]
3. Holds that there has been a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention;
4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention;
5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention; [...]